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#2A-10/31/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY UNIT #8400 OF THE 
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY LOCAL #845 OF THE 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10187 
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD WENDLING, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CONBOY, MC KAY, BACHMAN & KENDALL, ESQS. 
(WILLIAM MAGINN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The St. Lawrence County Unit #8400 of the St. Lawrence 
County Local #845 of the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) excepts to the 
dismissal of its charge against the County of St. Lawrence 
(County), which alleges that the County violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on 
March 31, 1988, it refused to execute a new collective 
bargaining agreement which did not contain a modification in 
the method of calculating the hourly rate of pay for 35-hour 
unit members, an item to which CSEA alleges the parties had 
not agreed in negotiations. 
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FACTS 
The unit which CSEA represents includes both 35-hour per 
week employees and 40-hour per week employees. Under the 
terms of the expired agreement between the County and CSEA, 
3 5—hour per^week employees in fact worked—"summer—hoursn, 
consisting of 3 0 hours per week during the months of July and 
August. Under the expired agreement, the hourly rate for 
overtime compensation purposes for such employees and the 
hourly rate for part-time employees was calculated by 
dividing 1,776 hours into the annual salary of 3 5-hour per 
week employees. Apparently, the 1,776 divisor was arrived at 
based on an estimate of the total number of hours per year 
worked by 35-hour per week employees, which took into account 
the summer hours. In contrast, under the expired agreement, 
the hourly rate for 40-hour per week employees was calculated 
on the basis of 2,080 hours divided into annual salary for 
the purpose of computing overtime compensation and hourly 
rate for part-time employees performing the work of 40-hour 
per week employees. 
During the course of negotiations for a successor 
collective bargaining agreement, the County sought the 
elimination of summer hours for 35-hour per week employees. 
In the early stages of bargaining on the issue, the County 
identified it as including "all related contractual changes." 
However, the County subsequently identified three contract 
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articles, in addition to the article granting summer hours, 
which would be affected by the elimination of summer hours. 
These articles related to changes in the rate of accrual of 
personal, vacation and sick leave which would take into 
accountr^he iTLcreasTa^t^^ 
and August. Article XVIII, Section 6 of the expired 
agreement, which establishes the method of computation of the 
hourly rate for both 40-hour per week employees and 35-hour 
per week employees, was not listed by the County as a 
section requiring change by virtue of the elimination of 
summer hours. 
Notwithstanding its previous failure to identify Article 
XVIII, Section 6 as a section requiring modification by 
virtue of elimination of summer hours, the County presented 
to CSEA a proposed final agreement, following ratification of 
the tentative agreement by both parties, which eliminated the 
30-hour week summer hours and established a year-round 35-
hour work week, and changed the divisor applicable to 35-hour 
per week employees for determination of an hourly rate of pay 
from 1,776 to 1,820. The County asserts that this change is 
merely the result of a mathematical computation reflecting 
the increase in the length of the work year for 35-hour per 
week employees and is encompassed within the demand by the 
County for the elimination of summer hours "and all related 
contractual changes." 
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DISCUSSION 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined, 
after hearing, that the change made by the County in the 
proposed collective bargaining agreement submitted to CSEA 
for execution re^lecting^^n increase in the—hourly divisor 
for determination of hourly rates of pay of 35-hour per week 
employees was merely a mathematical computation logically 
necessitated by the parties' agreement to increase the work 
year of such employees from approximately 1,776 to 1,820 
hours resulting from the elimination of July and August 
summer hours. He further determined that failure to increase 
the hourly divisor would produce anomalous results, such as 
higher pay for part-time employees for the same number of 
hours of work as full-time employees, and a higher rate of 
overtime compensation for 35-hour per week employees than for 
otherwise equally paid 40-hour per week employees. Finding 
that maintenance of the 1,776 divisor would have required 
affirmative negotiations to produce such an unusual result, 
the ALT concluded that the change made by the County in the 
proposed collective bargaining agreement from 1,776 to 1,820 
was merely a technical rather than a substantive change not 
requiring specific negotiations. He accordingly dismissed 
CSEA's charge against the County. 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts, among other things, 
that the ALJ erroneously found that in exchange for the 
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elimination of summer hours, the 35-hour per week employees 
achieved an 11% salary increase during the first year of the 
tentative agreement, 6% more than all other unit employees, 
and that this additional salary, together with corrections in 
the^rateof^accrual—of^personal^^vacation—and sick leave 
during the months of July and August to reflect the increased 
work time constituted the quid quo pro for elimination of 
summer hours. CSEA alleges, and we agree, that the record 
does not support a finding that the 11% salary increase was 
limited to 35-hour per week employees, but was in fact an 
across-the-board salary increase for all unit members, 
although treated as compensation to the unit for loss by 3 5-
hour employees of summer hours. 1/ 
While this finding of fact does tend to diminish the 
weight of the argument that 35-hour per week employees 
achieved special salary gains in exchange for loss of summer 
hours, and that maintenance of the 1,776 hour divisor was 
therefore neither intended nor expected by the parties to 
constitute an additional benefit in exchange for loss of 
summer hours, the AKT's dismissal of the charge does not turn 
upon the gain of special salary benefits by 35-hour per week 
employees. In fact, the ALJ decision rests upon a finding 
•i/Both parties referred to the first year 11% salary 
increase (in comparison to much smaller increases in the 
second and third years of the agreement) as the "summer hours 
buy back", although it applied to unit members who did not 
have or give up summer hours. 
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that "the absence of negotiations to maintain [the 1,776] 
divisor, where the condition upon which it was predicated has 
been removed in negotiations, establishes the parties1 
understanding that the method for calculating the divisor for 
aH^salaried emplroyees—wouldbebased^upoTr thesame^factors; 
the actual number of hours worked per week and the number of 
weeks in their work year (52). 
"2/ 
CSEA asserts that this 
finding is unsupported by the record, because there is no 
evidence that the parties affirmatively understood or agreed 
that the divisor would be changed to reflect the actual 
number of hours worked per year, and that the determination 
that the absence of negotiations indicates an intent to make 
an affirmative change is contrary to the operating principle 
that a party seeking to make a change has an affirmative 
responsibility to place the issue on the bargaining table. 
We find that the ALJ's dismissal of the charge should be 
affirmed, although on somewhat different grounds than those 
set forth in his decision. 
We find that uncontroverted testimony was received, 
without objection, which establishes that the 1,776 hour 
divisor was arrived at by the parties under prior collective 
bargaining agreements based upon a "best estimate" of the 
number of hours per year actually worked by 35-hour per week 
employees, in the same fashion that the hourly divisor of 
^/see Saint Lawrence County, 22 PERB 5[4560, at 4652 (1989). 
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2,080 was arrived at for 40-hour per week employees. The 
manner in which both of these numbers were arrived at and 
agreed upon by the parties was by calculation of the actual 
number of hours worked during each week of the calendar year. 
The figures are "best—estimates"-,—because of—the variatdon in 
any given calendar year in the actual number of work days 
encompassed by the calendar year and encompassed by the 
months of July and August. In any event, this negotiating 
history establishes that the hourly divisor for computation 
of overtime compensation and hourly paid employees was 
intended to, and was in fact, exclusively based upon actual 
numbers of hours worked per year. This fact, in conjunction 
with the affirmative agreement to modify the length of the 
work year of 35-hour per week employees, would render 
retention of the 1,776 hour divisor inconsistent with a 
negotiated change in length of work year and therefore 
subject to correction in the final agreement without 
additional negotiation. Yonkers Federation of Teachers, 
Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO, 8 PERB [^3020 (1975) . Furthermore, 
as we held in Deer Park Union Free School District, 13 PERB 
53048, at 3079 (1980): "We look to the intent of the parties, 
as determined by their established custom or by the 
reasonable implications of the language they have used to 
memorialize the agreement they reached in negotiations" to 
determine whether the collective bargaining agreement 
Board - U-10187 
-8 
proffered for execution is in accordance with the terms of a 
memorandum of agreement reached by the parties. 
Applying these principles to the instant case, we find 
that, given the negotiating genesis of the hourly divisor, 
correction^of~the^d±visoir^based^upon-theincrease^^i—the workr 
year for 35-hour per week employees is nothing more than a 
technical correction which, if not made, would render 
separate sections of the collective bargaining agreement 
inconsistent with each other. CSEA's complaint that the 
County should have insured that it fully and correctly 
identified each article to be affected by the negotiated 
change is well founded and warrants correction as a matter of 
sound labor negotiation practice. However, the County's 
failure to do so in this particular case neither binds it to 
an agreement which contains the inconsistency found, nor does 
it amount to a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 31, 1989 
Albany, New York 
O. 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
C v ^ - r*** "Ufci^J* K 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member r 
#2B-10/31/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL NON-INSTRUCTIONAL 
EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, #4512, 
Charging Party, 
and- CA-S-E—NO—U---1-06-Q7-
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
HELEN W. BEALE, for Charging Party 
MELINDA BURDICK, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Madison 
Central School District (District) to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) decision which finds it to have violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by insisting, beyond 
fact-finding, upon the continuation in a successor agreement of a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation contained in the expired 
agreement between the District and the Madison Central School 
Non-Instructional Employees' Association, NYSUT, AFT, #4512 
(Association). 
In particular, the ALJ found that Article II, entitled 
"Negotiation Procedures," and which was contained in the expired 
collective bargaining agreement, is a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because it seeks to determine how the parties will 
negotiate. Citing our decisions in Town of Shelter Islandr 
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12 PERB 53112 (1979); CSEA, Local 832, 15 PERB f3101 (1982), and 
County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 17 PERB ^3 03 3, 
conf'd sub ngm. County of Saratoga and Saratoga County 
Sheriff v. Newman, 124 Misc.2d 626, 17 PERB ?[7010 (Sup. Ct. , 
Sara^Cov7l982)^^theA]^ found that insistence—on demands which 
seek to fix the manner in which the parties will negotiate 
violates the duty to negotiate in good faith, because these 
matters are preliminary and subordinate to the substantive 
negotiations between the parties. 
The ALJ further found that insistence upon continuation of 
nonmandatory language in an expired agreement may give rise to a 
claim of violation of the Act in the same manner as a demand 
which proposes substantive changes or deletions. This finding is 
in accord with our decision in Dobbs Ferry Police Associationf 
Inc., 22 PERB ^3039 (1989) (appeal pending). 
The District's first exception alleges, in essence, that the 
Association is barred by the principle of equitable estoppel from 
asserting a violation of the Act because it was the Association 
which first sought to negotiate a modification of Article II and 
the District merely responded to the proposed modification by 
seeking continuation of the expired language. Second, the 
District excepts to the ALJ finding of fact that it improperly 
insisted upon continuing the prior contract language, asserting 
that such a finding is unsupported by the record. 
As to the first exception, it is our determination that the 
-2 
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question whether the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act 
is not before us, and was not the subject of an improper practice 
charge by the District. Accordingly, we make no finding 
concerning whether the Association first or also violated the 
Act Even if the District's allegation of violation by the 
Association were properly before us and proven, however, it would 
not constitute a defense to the charge before us. See 
Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, 21 PERB 53 022 
(1988). We there stated, at 3045: "Commissions of improper 
practices by both sides (assuming that they took place) do not 
serve to cancel each other out." The District's first exception 
is accordingly denied. 
As to the District's second exception, it is our 
determination that the ALT's finding that the District sought 
continuation of Article II, "Negotiation Procedures," of the 
expired agreement is supported by the record. Although the 
District made no express demand relating to Article II, it did 
demand, in conjunction with a set of post fact-finding proposals, 
that "all other items remain status quo except those previously 
tentatively agreed to." The District asserts before us that this 
language was intended to relate exclusively to the contents of the 
fact finder's report. However, this assertion is not supported by 
evidence contained in the record and the ALT reasonably construed 
the language of the District proposal as being framed in terms of 
amendments to the expired collective bargaining agreement. 
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Based upon the foregoing, it is our determination that the 
record adequately supports the ALJ's finding that the District 
sought to negotiate the continuation of Article II (Negotiation 
Procedures) of the expired agreement, a nonmandatory item, in a 
successor eTgreement~beyondT—factfinding. The-Finding of^TioratiolT 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Act is accordingly affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Madison Central School 
District cease and desist from refusing to negotiate in good 
faith by demanding the continuation of Article II in a successor 
agreement. 
DATED: October 31, 1989 
Albany, New York 
//Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Af>^ 
#2C-10/31/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF PATROL OFFICERS, 
Petitioner, 
^-arrd—* CASE NO^C—3402 
COUNTY OF ERIE AND ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
- and -
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 264, 
Intervenor. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY, ESQS. (SCOTT D. HARRIS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ. and DONALD EHINGER, Director, 
Labor Relations, for Joint Employer 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SCHULLER & JAMES, 
ESQS. (RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The County Association of Patrol Officers (CAPO) excepts 
to the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) of its petition which 
seeks to fragment an existing unit of all employees of the 
County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff (Joint Employer) now 
represented by Teamsters, Local 2 64 (Teamsters). In 
particular, CAPO seeks to separately represent a unit 
comprised of criminal deputies and ranking officers assigned 
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to road patrol and investigative services who are police 
officers, by removing them from a unit which includes 
civilian employees and peace officers. The peace officers 
are designated as deputy officers providing routine security 
and guard services at the County's holding center, in the 
County and State courts, at the Erie County Medical Center, 
and, in part, during the transport of prisoners. 
The Director, in keeping with the standards enunciated 
by this Board for review of fragmentation petitions, 
conducted an investigation into the question whether a 
compelling need exists for fragmentation, as established by 
evidence of a conflict of interest between the employees 
within the petitioned-for unit and other unit members or 
inadequate representation of the petitioned-for unit 
members. 1/ 
Applying these standards to the facts in the instant 
case, the Director concluded that neither a conflict of 
interest nor inadequate representation had been sufficiently 
established to warrant fragmentation of the police officers 
from the remainder of the unit. 
Among its exceptions, CAPO argues that because road 
patrol deputies are police officers, the provisions of §209.4 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), which 
•1/see, e.g. , State of New York (Long Island Park, 
Recreation and Historical Preservation Commission), 22 PERB 
^3043 (1989); Chautaugua County BOCES. 15 PERB 53126 (1982). 
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entitles police officers who are members of an organized 
police department or police force to impasse procedures 
culminating in interest arbitration, should, notwithstanding 
Board precedent, apply to them and warrant their 
fragmentation from the overall unit. 
As we held in Erie County Sheriff and Erie County, 
7 PERB f3057 (1974), the fact that certain deputy sheriffs 
are police officers does not mean that a sheriff's department 
is a police force or a police department within the meaning 
of §209.4 of the Act. This finding was supported by 
interpretations of other statutes which distinguish between 
police officers employed by a sheriff and police officers 
employed by organized police forces or departments. (See 
discussion at 3 094-95.) It is now clearly established that 
deputy sheriffs are not deemed to be covered by the impasse 
procedures contained in §209.4 of the Act. Whether, based 
upon the many reasons presented by CAPO, deputy sheriffs who 
are police officers, or deputy sheriffs in general, should be 
included in the §2 09.4 impasse procedures, is a matter for 
the State Legislature to decide. Certainly, as we found in 
Village of Skaneateles, 16 PERB ^3 070 (1983), entitlement of 
police officers to §209.4 impasse procedures is and would be 
a significant and perhaps compelling basis upon which 
fragmentation would be warranted. However, such a 
Board - C-3 402 -4 
set of circumstances is not now before us because of the 
inapplicability of §2 09.4 of the Act to deputy sheriffs, 
whether police officers or not. 
The remaining questions to be decided are whether the 
fact that road patrol deputies and investigators are police 
officers so distinguishes and separates them from others in 
the unit also having law enforcement responsibilities (e.g., 
court and holding center deputies) as to give rise to an 
actual conflict of interest warranting fragmentation,-2-/ or 
whether inadequate representation has been established. We 
have carefully reviewed the exceptions filed by CAPO with 
respect to these two issues and are nevertheless persuaded 
that the Director•s factual findings are supported by the 
record. For the reasons set forth in the Director's 
decision, we find that the record does not support a finding 
of the existence of an actual conflict of interest, nor does 
it establish inadequate representation of these employees by 
the incumbent employee organization. Fragmentation must, 
accordingly, be denied. 
2/ln County of Warren, 21 PERB H3037, at 3081 (1988), we 
held: 
We have previously considered and rejected the 
claim that there is an inherent conflict of 
interest between the responsibilities of road 
patrol deputies and correction officers in a 
sheriff's department warranting fragmentation of an 
overall unit of sheriff's department emplo.yees. 
Board - C-3402 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 31, 1989 
Albany, New York 
(ZrtM^Z £. 
rold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member * 
#3A-10/31/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and CASEh-NOn—.G-3-4-03— 
VILLAGE OF NORTH TARRYTOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
) Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time employees 
in the following titles: Intermediate Account 
Clerk, Intermediate Typist, General Foreman, 
Superintendent of Recreation and Parks, Sewer 
Maintenance Foreman and Building Inspector. 
> 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
'mutual obligation to'meetr~at reasonable-times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 31, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member-
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATRICIA SUHR and MARJORIE TAYLOR, 
Petitioners, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3557 
WAYNE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
WAYNE CENTRAL UNIT, WAYNE COUNTY 
LOCAL 859, CSEA, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding!/ having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayne Central Unit, Wayne 
County Local 859, CSEA, AFSCME Local 1000, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
•1/ The proceeding was instituted by a petition seeking 
decertification of the intervenor as negotiating agent. 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
All regularly scheduled full- and part-time 
employees in the following titles: Senior 
Stenographer, Senior Typist, Senior Account 
Clerk, Account Clerk, Library Clerk, Typist, 
Switchboard ReceptionistT^ClerkT^Teachex 
Aide, Senior Custodian, Stores Clerk, 
Custodian, Cleaner, Courier, Groundskeeper, 
Head Mechanic, Mechanic, Bus Driver, 
Transportation Clerk, Food Service Helper, 
Registered Nurse, Cook Manager, Noon Monitor. 
All management and confidential employees and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wayne Central Unit, Wayne 
County Local 859, CSEA, AFSCME Local 1000, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 31, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
